

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday 22 August 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. J. de CASTRO (Brazil)

63-20103

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO
Mr. E. HOSANNAH
Mr. J. LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. D. TEHOV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Lij MIKAEL IMRU

India:

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. R. KRZYZANOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Baron C.H. Von PLATEN
Mr. S. LOFGREN
Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. AHMED OSMAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. D.N. BRINSON
Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C STELLE
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. T.R. PICKERING
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): I declare open the one hundred and fifty-fourth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The Committee will remember that the Italian delegation has always, since the outset of our Conference, emphasized the importance of partial agreements on disarmament. Limited though they may be, they can quickly help to improve the international situation and restore confidence, which is, in my view, essential.

A specific first step -- the conclusion of a first treaty on a collateral measure of very great value -- confirms the soundness of this viewpoint and encourages a thorough examination of all the possibilities for further agreements which exist in the field of collateral measures.

It is therefore in a spirit of confidence and reasonable optimism that, following the Moscow agreement, (ENDC/100/Rev.1) we resume the discussion of collateral measures. The resumption may be for a fairly short period but our work, brief though it may be, can still enable us to decide on certain points, agree on overall principles and establish some premises which will be very useful to us later in attaining the speedy conclusion of formal agreements.

My first observation is that the very fact that the Committee has decided not to restrict in any way the matters to be examined, and to undertake a general survey of all our ideas (ENDC/PV.150, p.22) demonstrates that on both sides we are embarking upon this discussion with an open mind and in a spirit of mutual understanding. That is, indeed, the spirit which has always inspired the Western delegations and, in particular, the Italian delegation at this Conference. We have always been determined to try every avenue of approach and to leave none unexplored in order to facilitate the conclusion of agreements. At our previous meetings the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union have each given a list of the collateral measures which they consider the most likely to lead to tangible and rapid results.

Our first aim should be a speedy agreement even if such an agreement cannot be comprehensive. That is a first principle which should henceforth be regarded as established. Let us first seek relatively easy agreements which can be concluded quickly, and we can then pass on to others.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Another point, which should also be clearly stated, is that all the proposals to be examined, whether those of the West or the Soviet delegation, should always, if they are to be taken as a basis for fruitful work, observe the two fundamental principles of disarmament: balance and control. Those principles were not established in a restrictive way to serve exclusively as a guide in drawing up the treaty on general and complete disarmament. They are, on the contrary, generally valid for any agreement on halting the arms race and on disarmament itself. The requirements are the same in every case because the object is always to guarantee mutual security by means other than the dangerous arms race.

With regard to the Western proposals, we are certain that these principles -- balance and control -- have been respected. The Western delegations will always be glad to demonstrate that this is so at our future debates.

We wish we could say the same about the Eastern proposals, but we are not quite sure that these principles have been duly applied there. Among these proposals are some which have already figured in our debates, and the Western delegations have had occasion to show their perplexity and voice their criticisms, particularly with regard to the non-application of the principle of balance. However, we are not opposed to a fresh examination of the question, which we shall undertake, as always, with sincerity and good will while not forgetting the factors essential to our security.

It is in the light of these principles of balance and control, and bearing in mind our aims of peace and security, that we must, in particular, approach the study of recent Soviet proposals concerning control posts against surprise attacks.

(ENDC/113, pp.2,3) These proposals, indeed, are not new ones: they are, in part, parallel to somewhat similar proposals which were put forward not long ago by the United States delegation. (ENDC/70, pp.6,7) My delegation has always believed that the elaboration of appropriate provisions to prevent war through accident and surprise attacks is the first step to be taken after the banning of tests, and that the establishment of efficient control posts can be a useful and valuable measure, provided it is applied in accordance with the principle of balance. My delegation is therefore pleased to note that the Soviet delegation now favours measures against surprise attacks, and that the proposals of the two sides are close on some points. However, according to Mr. Tsarapkin (ENDC/PV.152, pp.7 et seq.), the measures against surprise attacks are not intended to be independent but would be conditional upon and subordinated to other rather far-reaching and delicate disarmament measures, which we have long heard

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spoken of here and which have been rejected by the Western delegations. If the Soviet delegation persists in this view, the very nature of the measures against surprise attacks will be distorted. Control posts constitute a well-defined problem which is not in itself a very simple one. Care will have to be taken that in an agreement the establishment of posts is based on technical, military and geographical criteria to guard effectively against attacks and not on political or discriminatory criteria with other aims. But if this problem is broadened in scope and becomes entangled with other problems, it will probably prove insoluble.

The observations I have just made on control posts also apply to some extent to other proposals regarding collateral measures. I do not wish to go into detail but there are often points of contact and similarity between the proposals of the Western and Eastern countries, intermingled, however, with points of disagreement and differences of viewpoint. It seems to me that when we examine these questions we should adopt a method of work similar to that which has resulted in the conclusion of the agreement banning tests in three environments. If we had the wisdom to concentrate our efforts on those parts of the existing proposals which are alike, while putting the others aside for the time being, we could achieve agreements which, though limited, would be effective. Such agreements are, in my opinion, within our reach. If, on the contrary, we insist at this stage of our work upon agreements of very broad scope, we might well run into serious difficulties and suffer disillusionment or serious delays.

In other words, we should proceed realistically, with the same wisdom and prudence shown by the nuclear Powers when the test ban treaty was concluded. Moreover, if we postpone the obstacles which cannot be overcome now, we shall probably find later, once the first agreements have been concluded, that the obstacles are much less formidable and insurmountable than we thought.

Appeals have already been made here to the non-aligned delegations to participate in and contribute to our work on collateral measures. I notice that they have already made an important contribution. For instance, the Conference has before it the proposal of certain Latin American countries that Latin America be denuclearized. (ENDC/87) My delegation and several others seated round this table have supported this proposal because it is conducive to peace and meets certain well-defined requirements necessary for agreements of this kind. I hope that the Committee will continue to work for the implementation of this important proposal.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Other proposals which have received the support of the non-aligned delegations deserve consideration. I have in mind, for example, the proposal to prohibit the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons, which has been particularly stressed by the Mexican representative, who has already submitted a text on the subject (ENDC/98).

The recent agreement on co-operation in outer space concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union gives ground for hope that understandings between the two great nuclear Powers can even extend to the military sphere, so that the skies may be the scene of scientific co-operation and not of terrifying military rivalry.

Up to now I have spoken of specific -- I will even say tangible -- collateral measures. But there are others which have been proposed by the Soviet delegation and which are more like declarations of intent and have a moral or purely political value. Thus, the Soviet delegation first proposed to us last year a declaration against war propaganda, (ENDC/C.1/20) and now proposes a non-aggression pact between the member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty States. (ENDC/77) My delegation co-operated fully at the time in the attempt to reach agreement on banning war propaganda, which unfortunately could not be concluded last year. The Italian delegation wonders if the conclusion of this agreement would not be easier now, when the atmosphere is less charged with polemics and everyone is striving, here and elsewhere, to avoid the use of offensive, insulting and threatening expressions. An agreement to prohibit war propaganda, open to all countries, might be an appropriate prelude to other similar agreements of a predominantly moral nature and containing declarations of intent.

With regard to the proposal for a non-aggression pact, about which Mr. Tsarapkin again spoke at our meeting of 16 August (ENDC/PV.152, pp.7 et seq.), the draft of that pact is now being studied by the Governments of the Western countries and you will not be surprised if I refrain from committing myself on that subject today. May I just say that we are and always have been opposed, with or without specific pacts, to any direct or indirect aggression, to any material or verbal threat and to any subversive or intolerant action against freedom and the free and independent life of nations. We should like to eliminate these threats everywhere, in both hemispheres, in all continents, not only in Europe, but also in countries which belong to certain military alliances. That is the great task of the United Nations, which has perhaps an increased responsibility now that the prospects of a lasting peace are beginning to emerge. All the countries of the world should co-operate, and enjoy these very promising prospects.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): Almost a year and a half has gone by since our Committee started its work. It would be natural to expect that with the setting up of the Committee and the beginning of its work the armaments race would have ceased or at least been restricted, which would have enabled the Committee to carry out its main task -- the preparation of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control -- in a more peaceful atmosphere. However, as has already been repeatedly emphasized at our meetings, not a single weapon has been destroyed during that period, not a single atom bomb has been withdrawn from the arsenals of States; moreover, the armaments race has continued at a still greater pace. During the past eighteen months the military budgets of the major Powers of the Western world have reached record levels for peace time; United States submarines armed with Polaris missiles have appeared in the Mediterranean; NATO is preparing to create so called "multi-national" and "multi-lateral" nuclear forces; Canada is now receiving nuclear weapons, and so on.

It cannot be said that our main task is being successfully accomplished either, because we are still discussing a number of provisions for stage 1 of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and, unfortunately, we still have not achieved any progress or agreement on the main issues.

Precisely the awareness that the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament is no easy task has, from the very outset, made us come to the conclusion that we should also discuss other measures which, while not being direct disarmament, would be likely to reduce the risk of a military conflict before the time when general and complete disarmament will have been carried out as the sole guarantee of lasting and inviolable peace.

The treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1) recently signed in Moscow is precisely one of those measures which, while not being disarmament in the full sense of that word, help towards improving the political atmosphere in the world and, in the final analysis, contribute towards the achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament. The Moscow Treaty, together with the other positive aspects which it has and which have been generally noted, shows also that so-called "collateral measures" should not be neglected and that they deserve to be studied most seriously and solved as quickly as possible.

(Mr. Lukyanov, Bulgaria)

It is well known that many such measures have been proposed at one time or another, particularly on the part of the Soviet Union: recently a number of such measures have been proposed by the Soviet Government, but in new circumstances which make them more urgent and facilitate their adoption. The Soviet delegation in our Committee has explained systematically and in a reasoned way the arguments in favour of the adoption of such "collateral measures". The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria fully supports the Soviet delegation's proposals relating to measures which, logically, should follow the Moscow Treaty; we also support the arguments adduced by the Soviet delegation in support of its proposals. I should like to point out that the Government and Parliament of Bulgaria have already repeatedly expressed their positive attitude towards many of those proposals.

In the first place, the Soviet Union's proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty (ENDC/77) was made after a preliminary discussion of this question by all the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, so that the Bulgarian Government supported that proposal from the beginning and continues to support it to this day. In the past few years Bulgaria has twice reduced its armed forces with a corresponding reduction in its military budget, so that the proposal for the reduction or at least the freezing of military budgets (ENDC/113, p.2) has been accepted by our Government and is supported by it to this day. When it was proposed in 1959 that the Balkans and the Adriatic should be declared a nuclear free-zone without missiles, and two years previously, in 1957, that Central Europe should be declared a denuclearized zone, (A/PV.697) both those proposals were also welcomed by Bulgarian public opinion and the Bulgarian Government with full approval. Our attitude towards the idea of creating denuclearized zones has also been confirmed by the position adopted by the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria when voting on the resolution to consider the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone (A/RES/1652 (XVI)) and on the resolution submitted by Sweden at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, a resolution which essentially pursued the same aim.

Our country has also given its positive support to the idea of establishing observation posts at various points where troops might be concentrated, in order to prevent the possibility of surprise attack. Furthermore, in a relevant declaration the Bulgarian Government has expressed its readiness to make the territory of Bulgaria

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also available, if necessary, for the siting of such posts. I should moreover like to point out that in all the declarations made by the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in regard to the aforementioned proposals, it has always emphasized its readiness to give favourable consideration to other proposals as well, whatever their origin, provided that they are aimed at the lessening of tension in the relations between States and particularly between States with different social systems, that is to say proposals aimed at the maintenance and consolidation of peace.

Why has the Bulgarian Government taken a positive attitude in regard to all the measures we have mentioned?

Underlying our position, of course, is the profound love of peace of the socialist system established in our country and the conviction that war can be avoided if powerful forces support peace and there is good will on the part of all governments. We see in these proposals a possibility of helping the governments of all countries to solve in a comparatively peaceful situation not only their internal problems, and particularly the problems of economic development, but also to arrive at the elimination of all danger of war through the elimination of the weapons themselves.

Although the arguments in favour of all these proposals have already been put forward and repeated on many occasions, I shall take the liberty of dwelling on some of them once again.

Let us take, for example, the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States (ENDC/77). The idea has repeatedly been stressed and has in fact never been denied that the conclusion of such a pact would strengthen confidence among States and would distinctly change the atmosphere of constant tension; it would help the work not only of our Committee, but also of all governments and public organizations which are anxious for the strengthening of peace; it would inspire the peoples to take up the cause of peace still more energetically. It suffices to visualize the territory occupied by the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty to realize the whole scope of such an agreement. It is a territory that stretches from Alaska to Sakhalin around the whole globe, a territory which, apart from its own significance, is contiguous to a number of Asian, African and Latin American countries. It is a territory in which the largest and most powerful armies in the world are deployed. The two military groupings existing in that territory include all the nuclear Powers and that in its turn gives a special significance to a non-aggression pact.

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Indeed, the question of how to prevent surprise attack and reduce the risk of war by accident is being widely discussed not only within but also outside of the Committee. It is beyond dispute that the danger of surprise attack or war by accident has considerably increased since the appearance of nuclear missile weapons. That is why the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between States possessing nuclear missile weapons would be of such tremendous importance, first of all because it would reduce the risk of surprise attack. We have witnessed the immense satisfaction and relief with which all the peoples of the world have welcomed the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests. It is not difficult to imagine how much greater would be the satisfaction and relief with which a non-aggression pact would be welcomed. How much greater would be the confidence of the peoples that they can look forward to the future in an atmosphere of peace!

In following the debates in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and bearing in mind the recently expressed opinions of the most responsible leading circles of all countries, we have not heard any serious objections to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty countries. Evidently such objections are altogether out of the question. The task laid down in the communique on the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/101) that the three nuclear Powers should continue consultations on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact is the best proof of that. Therefore we cannot agree with the view expressed here that, because of the consultations and discussions in higher circles, the Eighteen-Nation Committee is not a suitable forum for the consideration of that question. What is concerned is the prevention of the possibility of war and the maintenance of peace. There is no place in the world which would not be a suitable forum for the discussion of such vitally important questions. It would particularly ill become the Eighteen-Nation Committee to isolate itself within the four walls of its council chamber and to turn a deaf ear to the discussion of those vitally important problems. Our debates and recommendations on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact will not hinder but, on the contrary, will only help any forum which may be entrusted with the task of settling the question of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Did we not note and emphasize with due respect a few days ago the fact that the discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee had considerably facilitated the conclusion of the Moscow

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Test-Ban Treaty? The debates in our Committee on the question of concluding a non-aggression pact can play an equally useful part. The Soviet Union has submitted a specific draft proposal for this pact (ENDC/77). We have no intention of disputing the fact that the signing of such a pact would probably not take place in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and that the Western Powers, before signing it, would probably have to hold consultations with their allies. But even for the successful outcome of those consultations, the views of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, in which eight non-aligned countries from all continents are represented, will be of some importance.

In this connexion, we must say that the formal argument against the discussion of this question in our Committee, namely, that many States members of NATO are not represented here, is not a valid argument. As has repeatedly been emphasized, if the Eighteen-Nation Committee were to confine itself to the discussion of questions which only concern the countries represented here, it should be disbanded at once, because there is not a single question among those which it has been discussing which would not be of concern also to States not represented in the Committee or affect the destinies of the whole world.

There are two other objections to discussing in our forum the question of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact -- objections with which we likewise cannot agree. The first is the assertion that the discussion of such an issue would turn our Committee into an organ for the discussion of "questions of general policy" and would deflect us from our main task. Surely it is not necessary to emphasize once again that our main task -- an agreement on general and complete disarmament -- is a political task, that our Committee is not a technical body consisting solely of military experts, that each of its members represents his government in his efforts to achieve a solution of the main political problem of our time -- the elimination of war from the life of mankind as a means of settling its problems? Most of the questions which we are accustomed to call "collateral measures" are questions of a political nature and they cannot be anything else.

The last objection with which I wish to deal is the argument that a non-aggression pact is not directly connected with the problem of disarmament. Yet most of the so-called "collateral measures" are precisely of such a nature; they are not directly connected with disarmament, are not in themselves disarmament, but at the same time they facilitate the creation of a more favourable international situation for the solution of the problem of disarmament.

(Mr. Lukyanov, Bulgaria)

So we consider that the next step after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty should be a non-aggression pact. I shall take the liberty of quoting a few words from a recent statement on that question made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, who said on 15 August 1963:-

"The Bulgarian Government shares the view that the signing of a non-aggression pact between the States members of NATO and the countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty, proposed by the Soviet Union as the next step towards the lessening of tension, will be a further contribution towards strengthening peace in the world".

As I have already remarked, our country attaches great importance to the creation of denuclearized zones free from missiles. We note that the idea of creating such zones no longer meets with the same objections as a few years ago. On the contrary, the United Nations General Assembly has recommended that the whole of the African continent should be declared a zone free from atomic and missile weapons. It has also been proposed that Latin America should be declared a denuclearized zone. The point here is not only that in this way a certain number of countries and areas in the world are striving to avoid nuclear attack; the point is also that the existence of denuclearized zones would greatly limit the possibility of a nuclear war breaking out. There is no need to prove, for instance, that to declare Central Europe a denuclearized zone -- as has been proposed by the Polish Government -- including in this zone the two German States, Poland and Czechoslovakia, would be a substantial step towards consolidating peace in Europe and throughout the world. I note in parenthesis that the signing of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States would, in our opinion, to a great extent facilitate the implementation of this proposal.

We consider that it would be no less important to declare Bulgaria and the Mediterranean denuclearized zones. Our country, which is situated in this geographic area, is naturally very greatly interested in the creation of such zones. We do not doubt that this is also a matter of interest also to other Balkan countries, which, being small and densely populated, would suffer particularly heavy losses in the event of a nuclear conflict. But in this case we are being guided not only by narrow nationalistic interests but by the fact that the Mediterranean

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area and the Balkans are adjacent to many other countries, including those not forming part of any bloc as, for instance, all the Arab States situated on the southern and eastern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea.

One of the nuclear Powers -- the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- has repeatedly expressed its readiness to guarantee the status of the denuclearized zones, the creation of which would be agreed to by the governments concerned. We consider that agreement among the governments of the States situated in Central Europe and in the Mediterranean area would be achieved all the more quickly the sooner the Western nuclear Powers also agreed to become guarantors of the denuclearized zones. In the practice of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria there have been instances where the representatives of some Balkan States, while not rejecting in principle the idea of denuclearized zones, at the same time declined our proposals on the grounds that the great Powers and, in the first place, the nuclear great Powers, should first reach agreement on questions connected with disarmament, and, in particular, nuclear disarmament. We hold a different opinion: we consider that in the struggle for peace the small States also can usefully participate and that a number of regional agreements can facilitate to a great extent the task of reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament. We are satisfied that this point of view is already shared by a number of countries. The initiative of the African countries (ENDC/93/Rev.1) and of the Latin American States (ENDC/87) as well as the proposals of some Scandinavian statesmen (A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1, 2) serve to prove that this point of view has in the last few years been gaining more and more supporters.

But, regrettably, the Western nuclear Powers have not yet expressed a definite desire to support agreements of such a nature, which they could do by declaring their readiness to guarantee the status of denuclearized zones in any particular area of the world. Let us hope that in the course of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee we shall reach agreement on the creation of denuclearized zones, especially in such sensitive areas as Central Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

As I have already emphasized, military budgets have recently been growing at a rapid rate. It is well known, for example, that the budgets of the States belonging to the NATO military group have increased since the formation of that alliance by two-and-a-half to four times; that the budget of the Federal Republic

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of Germany exceeds the budget of Hitler's Germany on the eve of the Second World War; that the budgets of all the States members of NATO are unprecedented for peacetime conditions; that an ever-greater proportion of military budgets is being earmarked for equipping the armed forces of certain States with nuclear-missile weapons -- in short, that resources are being spent on war preparations, resources which, if used for peaceful purposes, would make it possible to improve living conditions in many a region of the world.

Is it not time indeed to put an end to this abnormal and dangerous situation? One of the first effective measures in seeking for ways of halting the dangerous armaments race would be, undoubtedly, the freezing of military budgets or, better still, their reduction. No serious arguments can be adduced to prove that such a measure might have an unfavourable effect on some country or people; but factual data can be adduced which show how heavy a burden for many countries and peoples are the military budgets and the constantly increasing direct and indirect taxes they involve. How is it possible to see in the reduction of the military budgets of the great Powers, say, by 10-15 per cent some sort of ulterior motive, a desire to create an imbalance or to gain a unilateral advantage? Still less is it possible to see such a desire in the proposal for the freezing of military budgets.

If this and other Soviet proposals on so-called "collateral measures" are carefully studied, it is impossible to find any sign of a desire to place anyone at a disadvantage. This is true of the Soviet proposals regarding a reduction of the numbers of Soviet troops in the German Democratic Republic and of Western troops in the Federal Republic of Germany; regarding exchanges of Soviet and United States missions between the Soviet troops in the German Democratic Republic and the United States troops in the Federal Republic of Germany. (ENDC/113, p.3) This is also true of the Soviet proposal for setting up posts at places where troop concentrations are possible, in order to prevent surprise attack. (ibid., p.2)

We are convinced that the adoption of the aforesaid proposals, whether successively or all together, would bring to all countries at least such a period of tranquility and peaceful development as is required for reaching final agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, which alone fully guarantees the establishment of lasting peace on earth.

Baron Von PLATEN (Sweden): I should like to revert to some of the questions previously raised by the United Kingdom delegation and admirably dealt with in detail in document ENDC/60 of 31 August last year, regarding the technical possibility of international control of fissile material production. This paper has been under study by our technical and scientific experts and we have found it a most useful ground-work and "ouverture" to joint studies here in Geneva. Indeed, after pondering and penetrating this analysis, we see good reason to set up a small group entrusted with the task of further studies regarding the problems and possibilities inherent in such international control. We would be prepared to collaborate in this. Awaiting the more comprehensive approach possible in such a group, my remarks will be of a preliminary and non-scientific nature.

I should perhaps say at this point that the reason I raise this subject today is that we envisage the possibility of having it either within the framework of general and complete disarmament or as a collateral measure. We find it a very encouraging conclusion that control over the production of plutonium and U.235 can be achieved with a margin of error of 1 to 2 per cent. It would also seem to be a good result if we could check on existing stocks with a 20 per cent margin of error. The reasoning behind these figures is not developed in full in the United Kingdom paper, but the facts given seem to support them.

It must be stressed, however, that these figures, good as they are, presuppose an elaborate control demanding a rather comprehensive and expensive, some may say even wasteful, co-operation of a great many highly-skilled technicians and scientists. For future consideration we would therefore like to pose the question if the control measures could not be reduced with maintained efficiency not by adapting control to the present industrial pattern and modus operandi, but rather by trying to achieve such production, storage and transport arrangements which would facilitate control.

The report mainly takes into consideration problems as seen from the United Kingdom angle. However, the United States, for example, has a wide experience in the matter of controlling the implementation of guarantees of peaceful use of fissile material. It would, I believe, be useful and interesting to hear the views of other countries on these subjects.

After these short introductory remarks I should like to say a few words about the more general aspects of the problem. I believe we must be careful in this discussion with our terminology. If we say, for example, that the cessation of

(Baron von Platen, Sweden)

production of fissile material for military purposes does not imply disarmament or diminish the kill and overkill capacity of the great Powers, then that statement is certainly correct. But if we say that such a stop, whether as a collateral measure or integrated at an early stage into a scheme for general and complete disarmament, does not limit the risks of a thermonuclear war, then we are, it would seem to me, being more than necessarily pessimistic, and perhaps even short-sighted. For the risk of a thermonuclear war, as opposed to the possibility to wage such a war, is in a wider perspective not just a function of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom having vast atomic weapons arsenals. On the contrary, the risk may well be much more connected with the spreading of nuclear weapons. That opens up vast and gloomy vistas, and thus it would seem to be of particular interest, politically speaking, to go carefully into the technical problems and possibilities of international control over fissile material production.

It has been said here that it is not very useful to waste time on technical studies if there is not the political will to accept the findings and perhaps not even the political will to study the subject. With that view I should like to differ respectfully but firmly. Rhetorics and repetition do not help us forward in our work. It is the long, slow, grinding work of people like the representatives here and our technical advisers which in a way made, for example, the Moscow test ban treaty possible. That work was often detailed, technical and even scientific. More often than not it seemed academic, sometimes useless and often hopeless; but it paid off. Metaphorically speaking, the photograph may have been developed by the able negotiators in Moscow but the picture and image certainly bear the imprint of the lengthy work done here in Geneva. Thus the Swedish delegation finds it of paramount importance that we dig into technical subjects so that we know the answers when our political leaders feel that they can accept advice and conclusions from the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference.

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): As the list of speakers is exhausted, and if no other representative wishes to take the floor, I shall take the liberty, before closing the meeting, of making some brief remarks, as representative of Brazil, on the manner in which my Government considers that this Committee should continue its work after the debate on disarmament in the General Assembly.

(The Chairman, Brazil)

The views that we have already expressed on a number of occasions during this Conference have not changed in any essential respect. We believe that it is still our fundamental duty never to lose sight, during our discussion of the various items on our agenda, (ENDC/52) of our principal goal of achieving the signature of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in accordance with the instructions (A/RES/1722 (XVI)) we have received from the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The satisfaction which we may feel at the partial success recently achieved with regard to certain individual aspects of the general problem of disarmament cannot and should not make us forget our main task which, although it may seem difficult, remote and arduous, is the one which the peoples of our countries and the peoples of the whole world expect us to accomplish.

It was with joy and hope that we welcomed in this conference room the two most tangible steps which have yet been taken by major nuclear Powers along the path towards the re-establishment of mutual confidence, as a preliminary to serious and frank talks on authentic disarmament measures, I refer, of course, to the agreement to establish a direct line of communication between the seats of government in Washington and Moscow (ENDC/97) and to the partial treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, (ENDC/100/Rev.1) under water and in outer space.

But it is obvious that this will not suffice to avoid war. Our position is clear. We shall not consider that our terms of reference have been carried out until we have succeeded in drafting the text, acceptable to all, of a treaty which can save mankind forever from the threat of new wars. And in this connexion we are still only at the preliminary stage.

Having said this once again, I should like to add that Brazil will always be ready to support any measure designed to improve the international atmosphere, which -- largely thanks to this Committee's efforts, as the representative of Sweden has just pointed out very pertinently (supra, p. 18) -- seems to be much more favourable than it was two months ago, so much so as to allow us to change our manner of thinking substantially and to envisage further important progress.

We still believe that partial and limited agreements, such as that concluded on the partial prohibition of tests, represent an important contribution to the cause of peace and encourage us to conclude fresh agreements of the same kind, each of which will bring us closer to our final goal.

(The Chairman, Brazil)

The so-called collateral measures, so long neglected, now seem to offer a very promising field for arrangements to eliminate certain obstacles standing in the way of disarmament, to test the sincerity of their signatories and to create the favourable atmosphere which is indispensable for the conclusion of general agreements.

We therefore consider that all the points on which agreement could speedily be reached should be studied and immediately embodied in further instruments open for signature to all the nations of the world, like the Moscow Treaty. That is the position which was expressed this morning by the representative of Italy (supra, p.5) and which we support.

We should like a certain priority to be given to some of the points which we think would enable us to make substantial progress, such as the prohibition of underground tests, measures for the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons and fresh measures designed to reduce the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication systems. We believe that article 1, paragraph 2, of the Moscow Treaty prevents the dissemination of atomic weapons to a certain extent, but we think that such a prohibition should be strengthened by the establishment of denuclearized zones in accordance with the proposals advanced or supported by some of the nations represented in this Committee.

The points I have just mentioned do not prevent us from thinking that any other measure which the nuclear Powers consider to be useful should be studied as a matter of priority. Our position with regard to this question is extremely realistic. We shall accept anything that may be practicable, whatever its importance, and we shall support any agreement, provided it represents real progress towards peace.

For all these reasons, I must express here my delegation's concern at the total ignorance in which members of the Committee have been left with regard to the progress of the direct negotiations now proceeding between the members of the Warsaw Treaty and those of NATO on the proposal for a non-aggression pact. (ENDC/77) We think that some useful ideas might certainly emerge here which would facilitate agreement and smooth away the difficulties between the two groups. Among these ideas, I should like to mention today the possibility of expanding the scope of the treaty which, instead of being limited to the two main military blocs, might with advantage

(The Chairman, Brazil)

include all the peoples of the world and thus be turned into a multilateral non-aggression treaty, open for signature or accession by all countries. In our opinion, the merit of this idea -- which seems to be sufficiently sensible and generous to attract the Committee's attention -- lies in the fact that it presents fewer difficulties of immediate drafting and would yield practical results equivalent to those of a limited pact between the two strongest military blocs, because, owing to its general nature, it would be in keeping with the political realities of the modern world. The Brazilian delegation considers that such a pact would make it possible to reduce more speedily the ideological objections and practical political difficulties which, crystallized as they are at present, are preventing a prompt, logical and desirable solution of this problem and are prolonging the negotiations and making them drag on interminably. The participation of less antagonistic and less committed nations in a general pact would make positions less difficult to reconcile, make acceptance easier and avoid the practical problems now hindering the signature of this instrument.

Another advantage would be that of allowing, in a series of compromises applicable to all, the participation of countries and regions which may be secondary from the military point of view, but which are of vital strategic importance, and would not regard themselves as bound by a pact concluded by a limited number of countries.

We have only a few meetings left before we have to appear before the General Assembly of the United Nations and account to it for what we have done on its behalf during these negotiations on disarmament. Fortunately, this time we shall not appear empty-handed and with a bitter feeling of frustration. We have established a good working foundation on which we can build the great edifices of the future. May the next session of our Conference bring us back here with fresh hope, with an even more conciliatory spirit and with the firm will to reach agreement on the essential points of our task, so that we can give shape to the aspirations for peace which will certainly be expressed in the General Assembly by the representatives of all the States Members of the United Nations. In the final analysis, it is they who will be the beneficiaries of our success or the victims of our errors and hesitations.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and fifty-fourth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. de Castro, representative of Brazil.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, Bulgaria, Sweden and Brazil.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 27 August 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.